Delta Investment Advisors

Shiprocket Limited

Incorporated in 2011 as Bigfoot Retail Solutions, Shiprocket is a software layer connecting online sellers to courier companies. It owns no fleet or warehouses. Sellers connect their online store, compare 42 courier partners on one screen, and Shiprocket handles labels, tracking, failed deliveries and COD collection. Core Business (domestic shipping and shipping apps) was 73.4% of FY26 revenue of 2,024 cr, and Emerging Business (cargo, fulfilment, cross-border, checkout, lending) 26.6%. It had 214,769 active merchants in FY26.

DRHP filed: Pre-filed confidentially with SEBI; Updated DRHP filed on 12 December 2025

IPO open & close: 12 August 2026 to 14 August 2026 (anchor book 11 August 2026)

Listing date: 19 August 2026 (tentative), on BSE and NSE

BRLM: JM Financial Limited, Kotak Mahindra Capital Company Limited, BofA Securities India Limited and Axis Capital Limited

Auditor: S.R. Batliboi & Associates LLP, Chartered Accountants

Disclaimer - Delta Partners (public market division under Dexter Capital) is not a SEBI registered Investment Advisor and this report does not constitute a recommendation but is only prepared for educational purposes. We (our team members including our directors) may or may not apply to IPO.

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Shiprocket runs a unique business model, a software layer that lets a small seller access courier companies at prices none of them would get directly. It has grown 41% a year since FY21 to 2,024 cr, but the business model poses structural risk if logistics companies consolidate, affecting its negotiating power and increasing competition. Companies like Delhivery, now at 35-40% of volume after buying Ecom Express, have started selling to small sellers directly. Barriers are low too, with NimbusPost, iThink and Shipway running the same API-led model. The core shipping business does earn & requires almost no capital, but its large merchants declined in FY26. At IPO ask valuation of ~3.5x P/S, it does not give much comfort at this stage.

One can expect good listing gains as per current GMP ~38% (13 August 2026), provided the GMP sustains.

A small seller wanting to sell online is either quoted at a rate that makes the sale unviable or is not taken on at all. Courier rates are slab-priced by volume, and the cost of signing, credit-checking, invoicing, supporting and settling cash with accounts that small is not worth the freight it brings. Coverage is the second problem: courier networks are spread non-uniformly, and one that is strong in one region can be thin and expensive in another. Shiprocket exists for the seller in between, dealing with 42 logistics companies directly on behalf of 214,769 sellers and handling the rate, courier choice, labels, cash-on-delivery collection, failed deliveries and weight disputes.

Shiprocket sits as a software layer on top of the seller's storefront, plugging into Shopify, WooCommerce, Amazon, Flipkart and over 250 other partners, so orders drop into one panel automatically. It had 214,769 Active Merchants (sellers who shipped at least once in the year) in FY26, of which 10,090 were Power Merchants (sellers averaging over 100 transactions a month). Every parcel is booked under Shiprocket's own account, so a courier signs one contract, raises one invoice and settles cash once instead of doing it 214,769 times, and gets a forecastable 176 mn parcels a year to plan capacity against. Shiprocket absorbs the seller acquisition, billing, credit risk and first-line support the courier does not want, running it with 248 people in merchant acquisition and 96.73% of Core onboarding completed without support-team involvement. It can also shift volume between 42 partners.

It has 2 business segments: Core at 73.4% of FY26 revenue and Emerging at 26.6%. Core is the domestic shipping platform & the paid apps sold on each shipment. Shiprocket's cost of the shipment (in core business) from courier was at 63.58 Rs and sold it to the merchant at 84.24 Rs, keeping 20.65, a markup of 32.5% (FY26). Across the platform, Active Merchants were 165,231 in FY25 and 214,769 in FY26. Power Merchants were 9,020, 10,005 and 10,090 over FY24 to FY26, so 4.70% of the base in FY26, and their ARPU rose from 12.8 lakh to 14.4 lakh to 17.8 lakh. The 4.7% power merchants only generated 89% of revenue (FY26). Within the Core business the picture is different. Core Power Merchants were 8,599, 9,242 and 8,815, so the count peaked in FY25 and fell in FY26, while their ARPU rose from 11.2 lakh to 12.8 lakh to 15.4 lakh.

The model needs the courier side to stay fragmented, and it is increasingly consolidating. Delhivery acquired Ecom Express for 1,407 cr (cleared by the CCI in June 2025), which increased its market share close to 35% to 40% by volume. Meesho, shifted volume to its own Valmo network; Shadowfax gained around 8% of share between July 2024 and July 2025 and listed in January 2026. Scale is the only route out of a thin-margin business, so smaller players will keep exiting or being absorbed. That poses two risks: Shiprocket loses negotiating power as its supply base narrows, which compresses the spread, and the larger couriers begin competing with it directly. Its top five couriers already carry 84.50% of its volume, with no exclusivity on either side.

Margins have not compressed yet. Core gross margin was 21.94%, 24.61% and 24.52% over FY24 to FY26, which had largely held, though the spread retained per shipment fell from 21.98 Rs to 20.65 Rs in FY26. The competitive risk is already visible. Delhivery has already launched Delhivery Direct for SMEs and Delhivery Protect for shipment cover, competing head-on with Shiprocket Quick and Shiprocket Secure. Amazon, Flipkart and Meesho now move 85%, 90% and over half of their own parcels through captive networks (Amazon Transportation Services, Ekart and Valmo respectively). Valmo carried nothing in FY23. Barriers on the aggregator side are minimal, since the product is an API integration and a negotiated rate. NimbusPost, iThink Logistics, Shipway, Shyplite, ShipYaari and ClickPost all offer the same multi-courier routing, and with no contract or lock-in, a merchant can run multiple platforms at once.

Revenue has compounded at 41.4% since FY21, from 358 cr to 2,024 cr, and the EBITDA loss narrowed sharply between FY24 and FY25, from -293 cr to -60 cr. Most of that came from employee costs falling 116 cr, of which 101 cr was simply a lower ESOP charge on fewer new grants.

Core segment growth slowed from 20.4% growth in FY25 to 13.7% in FY26 and its power merchant count fell from 9,242 to 8,815 sellers, though Core stayed adjusted EBITDA positive at 187 cr (13%), where adjusted EBITDA is the company's measure that adds back the ESOP charge and deducts Ind AS 116 rent. Emerging segment grew 65.2% to 539 cr and lost 169 cr (adj EBITDA). While the cost of acquiring a merchant decreased for Core segment, emerging segment kept it elevated. Core CAC, the spend on marketing, incentives and the acquisition team per new merchant signed, fell 31% over 2 years to 2,829, but blended CAC rose to 5,830 in FY26.
The business does not need working capital. Sellers load money into a Shiprocket wallet before they ship, and on cash-on-delivery orders the buyer's cash goes from the courier to Shiprocket, which then pays the seller within 0 to 30 days. Both sides of that leave money with the company: 121 cr of seller wallet balances and 121 cr of COD collections at March 2026. The cash conversion cycle is negative 10.34 days, operating cash flow turned positive at 52.6 cr in FY26 from negative 216 cr in FY24. It holds 821 cr in cash, bank balances and deposits as of FY26.

It made five acquisitions, and two of them were written off within two years, Omuni by 125 cr and Wigzo by 52.1 cr. Pickrr, the biggest at 1,128 cr. Total goodwill of 915 cr is 60% of the company's net worth.

The company has no promoter, which means nobody is required to hold a minimum stake and none of the existing shareholding carries the usual 18-month lock-in. All of it, including Bertelsmann's 21.32%, is free to sell after six months. The founders hold 4.84% each and have been selling for years, through secondary sales in 2020 and 2021, a buyback in 2022, and now 61 cr each in the IPO. 5 of the 7 investors selling are exiting completely.

At an EV of ~5,593 cr (~7,058 cr market cap / ~7,325 cr market cap FD) the ask is 3.5x FY26 P/S and 2.8x EV/Sales, against Delhivery at 3.4x and 2.95x, where Delhivery earned a 7.3% EBITDA margin, 347 cr of PAT and positive free cash flow in FY26.

Business

Shiprocket is a software layer between online sellers and courier companies. It owns no fleet, no vehicles and no sorting hubs. A seller connects its store, and Shiprocket pulls in each order, compares 42 courier partners on one screen, generates the shipping label, tracks the parcel, chases failed deliveries and collects cash on delivery on the seller’s behalf. FY26 revenue was 2,024 cr against 1,316 cr in FY24.
It reports two segments. Core Business is domestic parcel shipping plus paid software apps sold on each shipment, at 1,485 cr or 73.4% of FY26 revenue. Emerging Business is cargo and warehousing, cross-border shipping, checkout software and lending referrals, at 539 cr or 26.6%. Core share has fallen from 82.4% in FY24 as the newer lines grew faster.
A seller going online needs a storefront: Shopify or WooCommerce for an own-brand site, or a listing on Amazon, Flipkart or Meesho. These take the order and the money but do not move the parcel for a seller shipping on its own account. Shiprocket fills that gap, connecting to over 250 partners across carts, marketplaces, payment gateways and messaging tools so orders arrive automatically.
When an order lands, Shiprocket scores the risk that a cash-on-delivery buyer will refuse the parcel, drawing on that phone number’s behaviour across its network, with 83.01% claimed accuracy in FY26. It then ranks 42 couriers on price, that courier’s record for the destination pin code and the delivery date. 96.73% of Core onboarding in FY26 needed no support team involvement.
Courier rate cards are slab-priced by volume, so a seller shipping 200 parcels a month gets a retail rate or is refused, because signing, invoicing, supporting and settling cash with a micro-seller costs a courier more than it earns. Shiprocket signs one master rate card per courier and books everything under its own account. The top five couriers carry 84.50% of shipment volume.
The seller prints a PDF label and the courier collects from the seller’s own premises. The shipping fee is debited from a wallet the seller funds in advance, 121 cr across all merchants at March 2026. On delivery the buyer pays cash to the courier, which remits to Shiprocket net of freight, and Shiprocket pays the seller within 0 to 30 days. It held 121 cr of such collections.
Emerging bundles four activities. Cargo and fulfilment is 303 cr, covering freight booking and 13 leased warehouses totalling 762,826 sq ft. Cross-border is 139 cr across 21 partners, 5 lanes and 146 countries. Checkout and advertising software is 83.8 cr, with the checkout product powering 6,600 cr of order value. Hyperlocal delivery and lending referrals are 12.5 cr.
FY26 GMV was 32,777 cr across 202.08 mn transactions, an average order value of 1,622. The platform served 69.58 mn end consumers, of whom 57.78% had been served before. No single merchant is large: the top merchant is 2.83% of revenue and the top 20 are 17.65%. Named merchants include Mamaearth, boAt, Bata, Levis and Blackberrys.

Promoters and Leadership

Shiprocket has no identifiable promoter. It is professionally managed and VC backed. Saahil Goel (MD and CEO) and Gautam Kapoor (Executive Director and COO) co-founded it in September 2011 as Bigfoot Retail Solutions and hold 4.84% each. Bertelsmann Nederland is the largest shareholder at 21.32%.
The business pivoted twice before settling. It began as KartRocket, a shopping cart for Indian sellers, then Kraftly, a marketplace, and moved to shipping aggregation in FY17. Two other co-founders remain connected: Akshay Ghulati heads international shipping, and Vishesh Khurana ceased to be an employee on 31 May 2026.

Shareholding Pattern

Bertelsmann at 21.32% is the only holder above 15% and is not selling. Tribe Capital across two series holds 14.14%, Eternal (formerly Zomato) 6.85%, KDT Venture Holdings 5.49% and MacRitchie Investments (Temasek) 5.29%.
Founders have taken money off the table repeatedly since 2020, through secondary sales in February 2020 and December 2021, a buyback of 21,832 shares in February 2022, and further sales by Vishesh Khurana in August and December 2025.

Issue Details

Fresh issue size - Amount → 886 cr ; To be utilized in -

Marketing initiatives for growth of the platform → 206 cr
Investment in technology infrastructure and capabilities → 160 cr
Repayment or pre-payment of certain borrowings → 210 cr
Funding inorganic growth through unidentified acquisitions and General Corporate Purposes

Offer For Sale size - Amount → 732 cr ;

LR India Fund I, AFOS, Moore Strategic Ventures, Agility International and 500 Startups III will each sell their entire holding and exit completely.
Tribe Capital III Series 1 will sell 120 cr, taking its stake from 6.39% to 3.89%.
MCP3 SPV (March Capital) will sell 55.5 cr, taking its stake from 4.50% to 3.15%.
Saahil Goel and Gautam Kapoor will each sell 61.0 cr, taking their stakes from 4.84% to 3.37% each.
Vishesh Khurana will sell 20.0 cr, taking his stake from 0.99% to 0.58%.

Financials